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[John Ross is a free-lance journalist who has written on Mexican political and economic affairs for
many years.]
Mexican political tradition holds that the fifth year of the Mexican presidency is one of vastly
diminished powers for the lame-duck chief executive whose primary task is to guarantee a peaceful
and self-serving succession. Traditionally, the outgoing president has appointed the next president
by "pointing the finger" at his successor. This ritual, known as the "dedazo," has traditionally
occurred in September or October prior to the next election.
This arcane mechanism served the PRI for many years because the party has won every presidential
race since its creation in 1929. In fact, the PRI did not face any legitimate opposition until the 1988
and 1994 presidential elections. But the task of selecting a candidate for the 2000 election will be
more complicated because of changing dynamics within the party and President Zedillo's weak
standing in the PRI.
Zedillo, who came to the presidency by accident when the PRI's designated presidential candidate,
Luis Donaldo Colosio, was assassinated in Tijuana in early 1994, enjoys only a thin base of support
within his own party. Furthermore, he must also fight the perception that he is an ineffective
president who has been unable to resolve the conflict in Chiapas and the impact of the 1994 peso
devaluation on the Mexican economy.
The traditional "dedazo" is also threatened by a rift within the party. A handful of PRI hardliners such as former Puebla governor Manuel Bartlett Diaz and Tabasco Gov. Roberto Madrazo
Pintado have already taken the unprecedented step of declaring themselves available for the party's
presidential nomination. Zedillo has insisted he will not intervene in the selection of PRI candidate
for the 2000 presidential election, but insiders say the president is pushing for Social Development
Secretary Esteban Moctezuma Barragan.
An up and coming young politician, Moctezuma was interior secretary early during Zedillo's term.
But military officers pressured Zedillo to remove Moctezuma from the Secretaria de Gobernacion
(SEGOB) after he met with leaders from the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (EZLN) in
Chiapas in 1995.
Moctezuma's current cabinet post places him in a better position to obtain the PRI candidacy than
did his previous position in SEGOB. As head of the Secretaria de Desarrollo Social (SEDESOL),
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Moctezuma is in a position to trade government favors in impoverished communities for a pledge to
vote PRI. Luis Donaldo Colosio occupied the same position before former president Carlos Salinas
de Gortari designated him as presidential candidate for the 1994 election.
Furthermore, Moctezuma has already fulfilled the internal PRI requirement that its presidential
candidates must have previously been elected to a public office. Shortly after his ouster from
SEGOB, Moctezuma was elected to the Senate, representing Mexico City. Selection of presidential
candidate could divide PRI But Zedillo could face an uphill battle in gaining Moctezuma's
nomination for the PRI in 2000 because of formidable challenges from Bartlett, Madrazo, and
possibly Interior Secretary Francisco Labastida.
A recent poll conducted by the Guadalajara-based Centro de Estudios de Opinion (CEO) showed
PRI supporters favor Labastida, Bartlett, and Madrazo over Moctezuma. Bartlett and Madrazo
have already announced their intention to seek the PRI nomination and have both launched media
campaigns to lure voters to their side. Labastida has not declared his candidacy. Other formidable
candidates could emerge during the course of 1999. Veracruz Gov. Miguel Aleman Velasco has often
been mentioned as a potential candidate. Aleman, a former federal senator, is the son of Miguel
Aleman Valdes (1946- 1952).
The US favorite, Finance Secretary Angel Gurria, could also be formidable candidate, although his
reputation has been tarnished by the scandal surrounding the government bailout of the bankrescue fund (Fondo Bancario de Proteccion al Ahorro, FOBAPROA). Still another PRI candidate
could come from the ranks of the Mexican military, which is rumored to be pushing the party to
select one of its own for the job.
Such an uncertain cast of characters creates tensions inside PRI ruling echelons and is certain to
promote some exodus toward the center-left Partido de la Revolucion Democratica (PRD), where a
growing band of PRI dissidents have found refuge. Two former PRI members won governorships
under the PRD banner in 1998, and a third is expected to be a strong PRD contender for the
gubernatorial race in Baja California Sur later this year.
The fractious contention for the PRI nomination will likely spark vendettas and violence that could
make the bloody 1994 electoral year appear tame in comparison. Colosio and PRI secretary-general
Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu were assassinated in 1994. Raul Salinas de Gortari, brother of former
president Carlos Salinas de Gortari, is in federal custody on charges of masterminding the Ruiz
Massieu assassination.

Economic downturn could damage PRI's hold on presidency
To further complicate matters, the 1999 succession drama will be played out against a darkening
economic backdrop that has Zedillo pushing for draconian tax increases and offering the skimpiest
budget ever presented to Congress since the post-revolutionary period. The budget proposes to
reduce spending on social programs at a time when Mexicans are poorer than ever. Some estimates
put one-quarter of the Mexican population living in extreme poverty.
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Although a volatile stock market has leveled off at 3800 points, 1200 below its 1997 closing,
macroeconomic prospects for the coming year are bleak. The faith of international investors in
emerging markets such as Mexico was sorely tested by the 1998 Asian collapse, which caused a
steady flow of capitol out of the Mexico during the year. Global investors such as George Soros do
not discount a resurgence of market destabilization in 1999, based in large measure on the fortunes
of Brazil. Soros, who lost significant amounts of money in 1998, is the author of the book "The Crisis
of Global Capitalism," which decries structural weaknesses in the globalization process.
Should such dire prognostications come to pass, the PRI's lock on the presidency would be
irreparably damaged. The governing party, which has been held accountable for two economic
crises in the same six-year administration, could face maximum backlash at the polls in the year
2000. The fallout from renewed economic collapse would not only boost the fortunes of opposition
political parties but will strengthen the armed option that has flared during the Zedillo years in
highly indigenous southern Mexico.
The EZLN appears to be betting that fresh economic chaos will knock out the PRI in 2000, which
will enable the Zapatistas to obtain their cherished goal of indigenous autonomy. This goal has
been endorsed by the PRD's likely presidential candidate, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas. But the EZLN,
which disdains the opportunism of political parties, is preparing its own election in 1999: a national
referendum on indigenous autonomy now set for March 21.

Lack of opposition coalitions would benefit PRI
Nonetheless, a PRI defeat in 2000 is hardly a foregone conclusion. If economic catastrophe does
not occur, the governing party could actually experience a revival in coming years. The PRI amply
demonstrated its domination of Mexican politics with victories, albeit narrow, in seven of 10
gubernatorial races in 1998. PRI leaders are confident of repeating this performance in 1999, with
seven gubernatorial races scheduled for the year.
But the PRI could have been defeated in the seven races the governing party won last year if
the PRD and the center- right Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) had joined forces behind a single
candidate. In each of the elections, the PRD and PAN had more votes between them than the PRI. A
PRD-PAN coalition is not in the cards for the 2000 election, since both parties appear convinced they
can field strong candidates. The PRD's Cardenas, who enjoys considerable support in preliminary
polls, must first compete against other strong candidates that include former legislative leader
Porfirio Munoz Ledo.
Popular Guanajuato Gov. Vicente Fox Quesada is expected to be the PAN candidate in the 2000
election. Rare coalitions between the PRD and the PAN have generally been in regions where
neither party had much of a constituency, and efforts by the PRD to foment collaboration in the
past year have been consistently rebuffed by the center-right party. Any collaboration efforts were
dashed when the PAN chose to negotiate with the PRI in controversial votes in the Chamber of
Deputies on the FOBAPROA rescue and on the 1999 budget (see SourceMex, 12/16/98 and 01/06/99).
If the PAN and PRD continue to chart their separate paths, the PRI could find itself with a winning
hand in the presidential election on July 2, 2000. The fortunes of the Mexican economy in 1999
become of paramount importance.
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